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Abstract Atypical visual processing in children with
autism spectrum disorder (ASD) does not seem to reside in
an isolated processing component, such as global or local
processing. We therefore developed a paradigm that requires
the interaction between different processes—an identifica-
tion task with Gaborized object outlines—and applied this to
two age groups of 6-to-10 and 10-to-14 year old children
with and without ASD. Event history analyses demonstrated
an identification disadvantage in the ASD group, which
remained quite stable during the temporal unfolding of the
outline. The typically developing group particularly
outperformed the ASD group when more complex contours
were shown. Together, our results suggest that the interplay
between local and global processes and between bottom-up
and top-down processes is disturbed in ASD.
Keywords Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) 
Visual perception  Object identification  Weak
central coherence theory  Enhanced perceptual
functioning hypothesis  Bottom-up versus top-down 
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Introduction
Individuals with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are
characterized by qualitative impairments in social reci-
procity, communication and repetitive and stereotyped
behavioral patterns (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric
Association 2000). In 1943 already, Kanner associated
ASD with a local perceptual style, by inferring that chil-
dren with ‘‘autistic aloneness’’ have an ‘‘inability to
experience wholes without full attention to the constituent
parts’’. Current DSM-IV-TR criteria mention ‘‘persistent
preoccupation with parts of objects’’ as one of the mani-
festations of ‘‘restricted, repetitive, and stereotyped pat-
terns of behaviors, interests, and activities’’, and sensory
symptoms obtain a more prominent place in the new ver-
sion of the DSM (DSM-5; Wing et al. 2011). Thus,
although not central in the official DSM criteria, perceptual
symptoms were often described in children with ASD and
received considerable attention in theoretical accounts and
recent empirical work.
Atypical perceptual patterns have been the focus of two
prominent (neuro)cognitive theories in ASD, namely the
weak central coherence (WCC) theory (Frith and Happe´
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1994; Happe´ and Booth 2008; Happe´ and Frith 2006) and
the enhanced perceptual functioning (EPF) hypothesis
(Mottron and Burack 2001; Mottron et al. 2006). Both
WCC and EPF attribute a more locally than globally ori-
ented processing style to individuals with ASD, consistent
with results of several studies (for reviews, see Behrmann
et al. 2006; Dakin and Frith 2005; Simmons et al. 2009).
WCC originates in the observation of a rather detailed-
focused cognitive style in individuals with ASD, combined
with deficits in automatic Gestalt formation (‘not seeing the
forest through the trees’). Unlike WCC, EPF focuses on the
enhanced low-level perception of people with ASD, with-
out making any further claims about global processing.
Both theories are still further refined in confrontation with
recent empirical literature, and thus, differences between
them decreased since their first descriptions. Moreover,
both the role and influence of this atypical perception on
other domains of functioning in ASD, are still under debate
(for a critical discussion about the boundaries of the
explanatory power of WCC, see Ronald and Happe´ 2008,
and also Happe´ and Booth 2008, and for the importance of
an atypical, veridical, perceptual style in savantism, see
Mottron et al. 2013).
The empirical work on local and global processing in
ASD started with a classical study by Shah and Frith
(1983), who showed that children with ASD detected a
target shape embedded in a larger figure better than con-
trols (so-called Embedded Figures Test). Later studies
confirmed the atypical visual processing style using visual
illusions, block design tasks, visual search tasks, hierar-
chical figures, copy tasks, and discrimination tasks (for
reviews, see Behrmann et al. 2006; Dakin and Frith 2005;
Simmons et al. 2009). However, not all studies confirmed a
deficit in global processing style, nor superior detail pro-
cessing. Results seem to depend on participant character-
istics (e.g., age, intelligence level), task demands (e.g.,
focus on a global or local processing level, implicit or
explicit instructions: e.g., Evers et al. 2011), and stimulus
characteristics (e.g., basic, low-level visual stimuli such as
contrast or luminance detection versus more complex,
semantically meaningful stimuli). Moreover, the results are
sometimes difficult to interpret due to the vague concep-
tualization of local and global visual processing and their
many different operationalizations in specific experimental
variables (for recent empirical work on concept validation
of local/global measures, see Dale and Arnell 2013; Milne
and Szczerbinski 2009).
Neurocognitive theories, such as WCC and EPF,
emphasized either reduced top-down influences (Happe´
and Booth 2008; Loth et al. 2010; Mitchell et al. 2010), or
increased bottom-up processes in ASD (Mottron et al.
2006). In line with this point of departure, the literature has
mainly been searching for tasks on which children with
ASD show deficits in global processing and for tasks on
which they outperform typically developing (TD) children
(by using a superior local strategy). However, this search
has been complicated by the factors mentioned above.
Moreover, there are indications in the literature that the
differences in visual processing in children with ASD do
not reside in a specific isolated processing component.
Indeed, previous research focusing on specific component
processes of perceptual grouping mostly did not show
differences between children with and without ASD (i.e.,
no grouping disadvantages using low-level stimuli, e.g.,
Blake et al. 2003; Del Viva et al. 2006; Kemner et al.
2007). Perhaps the atypicality of visual processing in ASD
resides more in the interaction between top-down and
bottom-up (stimulus-driven) mechanisms, which is less
developed or less flexibly tailored to the stimuli and tasks
at hand in people with ASD (Barttfeld et al. 2011; Samson
et al. 2012; Wass 2011).
We have developed a paradigm that requires the inter-
play between different component processes and may
therefore be suitable to test this hypothesis. In a previously
developed object identification task, participants had to
identify an everyday object from tiny fragments along its
external contour, which were gradually shown for a longer
time (Panis and Wagemans 2009) or which were gradually
expanded until the full contour became visible (Torfs et al.
2010). These studies showed a nice interplay between
bottom-up grouping of contour fragments and top-down
matching of possible object representations, which could
be tracked dynamically over time (i.e., with increasing
stimulus duration or during the unfolding of the object
outline) and related to well-controlled stimulus factors
(e.g., object category, symmetry, and complexity). The
present paradigm adds a number of factors by using Gabor
elements that could be aligned along the contour (relating
to the extensive literature on contour linking using the
‘‘snake detection’’ paradigm; for reviews, see Hess and
Field 1999; Hess et al. 2003) or that could have the same
orientation within the surface area bounded by the contour
(relating to the extensive literature on perceptual grouping
and figure-ground organization; for a recent review, see
Wagemans et al. 2012). Moreover, by embedding these
target elements belonging to the object to be identified in a
completely irregular background of random Gabor ele-
ments, the present paradigm introduces the kind of clutter
that necessitates segregation processes in natural images.
Finally, the display is changing dynamically over time,
with the alignment of the Gabor elements along the contour
and inside the surface gradually increasing, again leading
to some kind of ‘‘unfolding of the stimulus’’ in the sense of
a gradual increase of clarity of the contour grouping, tex-
ture segregation, and object identity (see Fig. 1 for an
example and http://www.gestaltrevision.be/en/resources/
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supplementary-material for an animated version with the
same presentation speed as used in the actual experiment).
There is a rich set of processes involved in trying to
identify an object from such a dynamic series of Gabor
displays with an embedded contour and surface. By bind-
ing disjoint local elements on the basis of their proximity,
similarity, and so forth, participants can group the local
Gabor elements into a contour and a surface. These early
grouping processes help them to delineate a possible object
shape and segregate that from the background, which may
then lead to the construction of an object representation,
which in turn is matched to memory, resulting in object
identification. Then, a word label can be assigned to this
object representation, which leads to object naming. Note
that these processes do not have to operate in a strict
sequential fashion (Humphreys et al. 1988). Indeed, it is
quite likely that there is an intricate interplay between these
bottom-up and top-down processes. For instance, there will
be interactions between contour and surface grouping,
which will together interact with figure-ground segregation
and the formation of an object representation, and with
semantic processes (Sassi et al. 2010). Feedback from
candidate object representations can facilitate or hamper
grouping and segregation and so forth (Panis and Wage-
mans 2009). In difficult or ambiguous cases, several iter-
ations within this cycle of feedforward and feedback
processing can be necessary, in which different object
representations may be constructed and tested against the
available evidence.
By experimentally slowing down the contour build-up to
20 s (from fully random to maximum alignment in 20
frames of 1 s each) we can investigate the temporal
dynamics of these processes and their interplay. By using
event history analysis (Allison 2010; Panis and Hermens
2013; Panis and Wagemans 2009; Singer and Willett 2003)
to analyze the shape of the response time distributions, we
can study the temporal dynamics of the identification
process and its component processes over time. Moreover,
it allows us to evaluate the influence of certain predictors
(e.g., stimulus properties such as complexity, object cate-
gory, symmetry, and also participant group) on the shape of
the response time distribution during the stimulus build-up
sequence. Our stimuli consisted of contours of 56 objects,
representative for the type of objects and shapes one
encounters in daily life. At the same time, this heteroge-
neous set of contours is well-controlled on several low-
(e.g., number of elements in the background and on the
contour surface, contour length), mid- (e.g., compactness,
and homogeneity), and high-level stimulus characteristics
(e.g., identifiability). Previous research in TD adults
already revealed the impact of stimulus properties on
object identification (e.g., Panis and Wagemans 2009;
Torfs et al. 2010). For instance, fragmented outlines of
shapes with a low visual complexity are known to have an
early, bottom-up grouping advantage (in comparison to
complex outlines). However, once these simple shape
outlines are grouped, they will activate more object rep-
resentations (because they have a higher a priori occur-
rence), resulting in a slower top-down matching process
(Donderi 2006; Gerlach et al. 2004, 2006; Panis and
Wagemans 2009). Therefore, manipulating mid-level (e.g.,
complexity, symmetry) and high-level (e.g., object cate-
gory: manmade versus natural) stimulus properties may
provide us with a more detailed picture of the influence of
these properties on the identification process in both par-
ticipant groups. Not much research is focusing on the
influence of these specific mid- or high-level factors in
ASD. Yet, two contradicting studies are demonstrating the
atypical impact of mirror symmetry on performance in
individuals with ASD, by demonstrating a lower (Perreault
et al. 2011) or higher (Falter and Bailey 2012) detection
threshold for symmetry in children with ASD.
In sum, we believe this novel paradigm has the potential
to reveal possible differences in the interplay between
Fig. 1 Examples of frames within the build-up. In total, 20 frames
were used for the transition from completely random Gabor pattern
towards a fully organized version. Here a selection is presented,
ranging from completely unorganized Gabor pattern (frame 1)
towards a more organized version (frame 16)
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bottom-up and top-down processes while participants carry
out a task in which they are trying to make sense of a
changing input with variable levels of noise and structure.
If our hypothesis is correct and a major difference between
visual processing in individuals with and without ASD
resides in the interplay between local and global processes
and between bottom-up and top-down processes, then this
paradigm should be able to reveal a difference between the
two groups. In addition, the event history analysis would
show how this possible difference is affected by any of the
stimulus characteristics under experimental control, and
how this changes over time.
Methods
Although Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 have a similar
general set-up, both experiments differed in two respects:
the participants’ age (10-to-14-year olds in Experiment 1,
and 6-to-10-year olds in Experiment 2), and the details of
the stimulus build-up procedure (see ‘‘Stimuli’’). Both
experiments were conducted sequentially, in two different
data collection waves, allowing us to use the results of
Experiment 1 to make small adaptations (such as the
stimulus build-up) in Experiment 2. The use of two age
groups is interesting to test for the robustness and gener-
ality of the effects, and the two samples were chosen to
capture a large developmental window at school age.
Participants
Two groups of children participated in this study. The ASD
group was formally diagnosed based on the DSM-IV-TR
criteria (American Psychiatric Association 2000) by a
multidisciplinary team or a child psychiatrist. These chil-
dren were recruited via the Autism Expertise Centre at the
University Hospital and via a special needs school for
children with ASD. Diagnoses were confirmed with the
Autism Diagnostic Observation Scale (ADOS; Gotham
et al. 2008; Lord et al. 2000) in 41 out of 44 cases (matched
samples: Experiments 1 and 2: 19/21 and 21/23 ASD
participants, resp.). ADOS severity scores, which are cal-
ibrated scores ranging between 1 and 10 (Gotham et al.
2009), are included in the demographics table (Table 1).
Severity scores 4 and 5 are considered representative of an
ASD classification. The TD group was representative for
the general population and recruited through mainstream
schools, personal contacts and advertisements. According
to verbal reports from the parents, these children had no
child psychiatric disorder and no first-degree family
member with ASD. In addition, the average raw score on
the Dutch Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS; Constantino
2002; Roeyers et al. 2012) in the TD group was 24
(SD = 13.76, Experiment 1) and 24.94 (SD = 10.22,
Experiment 2), resp., both far below T70 (i.e., a norm score
of 2 SD above the mean, corresponding to a raw total score
of 60 for boys and of 55 for girls).
We only included 10-to-14-year old boys (Experiment 1;
detailed characteristics in Table 1) and 6-to-10-year old
boys and girls (Experiment 2; detailed characteristics in
Table 1) with an IQ C 70 (VIQ, PIQ and TIQ). Intelligence
was assessed with an abbreviated version (Sattler 2001) of
the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-III-R;
Wechsler 1992), comprising the following subtests: Block
Design, Similarities, Picture Completion and Vocabulary.
In total, 49 children with ASD (Experiment 1: n = 26, and
Experiment 2: n = 23) and 60 TD children (Experiment 1:
n = 24, and Experiment 2: n = 36) participated. We
selected a subsample of children with ASD and TD chil-
dren, to create two group-wise matched participant groups
matched based upon age and intelligence. None of these
children used neuroleptics (as reported by one of their
parents). All children reported normal or corrected-to-nor-
mal vision and were Dutch-speaking.
Stimuli
The stimulus set is a modified version of the standardized
set of 260 line drawings of everyday objects by Snodgrass
and Vanderwart (1980). Outlines were derived from the
object silhouettes, which were created by filling-in the
interior surface of the original line drawings (for further
technical details, see Wagemans et al. 2008).
In the present study, the object outlines were embedded
within arrays of non-overlapping Gabor elements on a
uniform grey background. A Gabor element is defined as
the product of a circular Gaussian (standard deviation of
.08 deg) and a sine wave luminance grating frequency of
3.57 cycles/deg. Along each object outline, Gabor patches
were oriented on equidistant locations. Object exterior was
filled with randomly oriented Gabor patches. The orienta-
tion of the Gabor patches on the object interior was parallel
to the main axis orientation (for further technical details,
see Sassi et al. 2010). The orientation of the Gabor ele-
ments changed with time, resulting in a transition from
fully random (only Gabor elements with random orienta-
tion) to fully organized (random exterior, organized interior
and outline) in 20 steps, each presented 1 s per frame. This
transition was organized linearly in Experiment 1 and non-
linearly in Experiment 2, with faster transitions early in the
sequence and slowed down transitions later on, so that
subsequent steps towards emerging organizations were
smaller in the second half of the sequence. Further details
of the build-up of these stimuli and examples of the stimuli
can be found in Fig. 2 and in Appendix 1. In Fig. 1 (above)
a static example of the stimulus build-up is displayed (see
J Autism Dev Disord
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for age (in months), performance, verbal and total IQ scores, SRS total scores and ADOS severity scores of the
ASD and TD group (Experiments 1 and 2)
Age PIQ TIQ VIQ SRS ADOS
Experiment 1
Full group
ASD group (n = 26), only boys
Mean 151.73 96.77 98.79 100.81 79.67 5.25
SD 16.40 14.59 14.43 20.15 24.09 1.59
Range 127–206 71–134 72–132 70–146 41–133 3–10
TD group (n = 24), only boys
Mean 151.54 110.00 111.21 112.42 24.00 N/A
SD 14.09 13.76 10.08 11.81 13.76 N/A
Range 132–179 83–132 91.5–130.5 97–135 7–56 N/A
p value (2-sided t test) .4686 .7828 .0883 .0165 \.0001 N/A
Matched group
ASD group (n = 21), only boys
Mean 152.76 101.38 102.93 104.48 79.94 5.11
SD 16.24 11.72 12.44 19.35 25.05 1.66
Range 128–206 80–134 79.5–132 70–146 41–133 3–10
TD group (n = 20), only boys
Mean 152.15 106.95 108.63 110.30 22.84 N/A
SD 14.39 12.68 8.61 11.38 11.96 N/A
Range 132–179 83–129 91.5–126.5 97–135 7–43 N/A
p value (2-sided t test) .8993 .1519 .0978 .2502 \.0001 N/A
Experiment 2
Full group
ASD group (n = 23), 20 boys:3 girls
Mean 103.87 103.13 102.76 102.39 94.64 5.39
SD 13.19 14.69 11.77 13.18 21.16 1.78
Range 83–123 77–134 84.5–130.5 76–135 44–135 2–9
TD group (n = 36), 27 boys:9 girls
Mean 102.17 106.72 109.81 112.89 24.94 N/A
SD 14.46 11.87 9.19 11.38 10.22 N/A
Range 80–125 83–134 90–128 89–135 8–56 N/A
p value (2-sided t test) .6499 .3062 .0128 .0019 \.0001 N/A
Matched group
ASD group (n = 23) 20 boys:3 girls
Mean 103.87 103.13 102.76 102.39 94.64 5.39
SD 13.19 14.69 11.77 13.18 21.16 1.78
Range 83–123 77–134 84.5–130.5 76–135 44–135 2–9
TD group (n = 25), 22 boys:3 girls
Mean 100.92 104.68 106.26 107.84 25.33 N/A
SD 14.70 12.16 8.32 9.16 10.60 N/A
Range 80–125 83–132 90–119.5 89–122 13–56 N/A
p value (2-sided t test) .4674 .6915 .2450 .1070 \.0001 N/A
In Experiment 1, SRS questionnaires from 5 children were missing or incomplete (full group: ASD: n = 4, TD: n = 1; matched group: ASD:
n = 4; TD: n = 1). In Experiment 2, SRS questionnaires from 6 children were missing or incomplete (full group: ASD: n = 1; TD: n = 5;
matched group: ASD: n = 1, TD: n = 4)
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http://www.gestaltrevision.be/en/resources/supplementary-
material for an animated version with the same presenta-
tion as used in the actual experiment).
We selected 56 stimuli (see Table 4 in Appendix 2,
Supplementary material) with high identification rates in
the fully organized version (above 70 %), as determined in
a large normative study by Sassi et al. (2010), comprising
28 outlines of natural objects (including animals, fruits,
vegetables and body parts) and 28 outlines of manmade
objects (including vehicles, furniture, clothing). The two
groups of outlines did not differ in the following stimulus
characteristics: mean identification rate, average contour
length, average number of elements on the surface, average
number of elements in the background, average compact-
ness, and on mean stimulus homogeneity (see Table 5 in
Appendix 2, Supplementary material).
Apparatus
All stimuli were stored in digital form (as bmp files) and
presented within the E-prime environment (E-prime ver-
sion 1.1.41. PST Inc.). Children were seated approximately
57 cm from a 17-inch computer screen, set to pixel reso-
lution 1,024 by 768 (16-bit color) at 75 Hz refresh rate.
Windows XP was used as operating system. Mouse and
keyboard were connected via USB connections to the PC.
Procedure
With written informed consent of their parents, participants
were tested individually in a quiet room. Because of
pragmatic reasons, this experiment was incorporated within
a larger series of experiments on visual processing and
emotion processing. After giving the instructions and only
if all questions children might have about them were
overcome, the step-by-step-practice protocol began. Par-
ticipants were instructed to respond (by clicking the
mouse) as soon as they could identify the object, even if
they were not completely sure about the identification.
All trials started with a 1 s fixation cross, followed by a
frame with fully randomized Gabor elements. Build-up of
the Gaborized object outline, frame after frame continued
until an answer was provided. Every frame was presented
for 1 s. When participants clicked on the mouse, the
stimulus disappeared and an answer screen appeared. Par-
ticipants responded verbally, their answers were entered on
the keyboard by the experimenter, and feedback about
correctness was given. In case of a correctly answered trial,
the build-up was aborted and the experiment proceeded
with the next trial. In case of an incorrectly responded trial,
build-up of the Gaborized outline proceeded further until
another answer was provided, or until the build-up was
completed. In that case, participants could give one last
answer, and then the next trial began (for an illustration of
the procedure, see Fig. 3). The build-up of the experi-
mental trials was identical to that of the practice trials. In
total, participants could thus provide answers at 21 time
frames (20 frames ? 1 after build-up).
This experiment consisted of 4 practice trials (same
trials for all participants; comprising 2 natural and 2
manmade objects) and 56 experimental trials (28 natural
and 28 manmade objects), with a short break after 30 trials.
Trial order was individually randomized.
Scoring
We developed clear scoring rules throughout this study (for
more details, see Appendix 2), which were used as criteria
to score responses as correct or incorrect, by slightly
adapting previously developed scoring rules (Wagemans
et al. 2008). Answers were scored manually. Given that
different experimenters were engaged in this experiment,
all recordings and their scores were checked afterwards.
Incorrectly scored items were corrected (in the case of
correct items mistakenly scored as incorrect) or deleted (in
the case of incorrect items mistakenly scored as correct).
For every participant-object combination, all answers, their
accuracy and their frame number was recorded.
Event History Analysis
Considering correct identification as the event of interest,
and frame of identification as a discrete time measurement,
we can analyze our discrete time-to-event data with dis-
crete time event history analysis (Allison 2010; Singer and
Willett 2003). This technique has two major advantages in
the context of our study. First, event history analysis pro-




















Exp. 1: Linear 
transition
Exp. 2: Non-linear 
transition
Fig. 2 Comparison of build-up of stimuli, illustrating the relationship
between the level of organization of the Gabor patches (vertical axis),
which ranges from 0 (fully random) to 1 (fully organized), and the
Frame number (horizontal axis), for Experiment 1 (linear transfor-
mation; dotted line) and Experiment 2 (non-linear transformation; full
line)
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of different predictors (i.e., object characteristics, partici-
pant group) by studying their effects on different parts of
the reaction time distribution. Since previous research
already indicated that different object characteristics have
an influence on the time-course of grouping and matching
operations, which are at the basis of correct object identi-
fication, it seems crucial to investigate the conditional
probability of identification throughout time in our ASD
sample. Second, in approximately 9 % of all trials
(Experiment 1: ASD group: 10.89 %, TD group: 7.05 %;
Experiment 2: ASD group: 10.72 %, TD group: 6.86 %),
participants did not correctly identify the object after the
last frame, i.e., correct identification (the target event in our
study) did not take place during data collection. These data
are thus said to be right-censored data (Allison 2010).
Whereas most traditional data-analysis techniques simply
ignore right-censored observations, event history analysis
takes it into account.
We will only briefly describe the main features of event
history analysis. For further details, we refer to Singer and
Willett (2003), and to Panis and Wagemans (2009). The 56
objects were treated as experimental units, whereas the
participants acted as repeated measures of these experi-
mental units. In an event history analysis, the distribution
of event occurrence (i.e., correct identification) is sum-
marized by two statistics: the hazard function and the
survivor function. The survivor function gives the proba-
bility that the object on trial i will ‘survive’ (i.e., not be
correctly identified) during time bin j. The discrete time
hazard probability h(tij) refers to the conditional probability
that the object on trial i will be correctly identified in time
bin j, given that it has not been correctly identified in
earlier time frames of trial i. Hazard probability ranges
between 0 and 1. Therefore, we apply a transformation
before generalized linear models (GLM) for repeated
measurements are fitted to the data. The nonlinear, asym-
metric complementary log-log link function was used
(cloglog hazard = ln(-ln(1 - hazard))), because this
transformation is most appropriate when discrete time
methods are used to measure a continuous underlying
metric of time (Panis and Wagemans 2009; Singer and
Willett 2003; Torfs et al. 2010). To fit the hazard model,
the surveylogistic procedure of SAS 9.3 was used.
We included the following four dichotomous predictors
in our model: participant group (1 for the ASD group, and 0
for the TD group), object category (1 for natural objects, and
0 for manmade objects), global symmetry (1 for symmetrical
objects, and 0 for asymmetrical ones), and homogeneity of
the object outline (we recoded homogeneity into a dichoto-
mous variable, based upon a median split: 1 for the most
homogeneous (simplest) half of the objects, and 0 for the








Fig. 3 Illustration of the
experiments’ procedure. After
the 1 s presented fixation cross,
a frame with randomized Gabor
elements was presented. The
frame-by-frame build-up of the
Gaborized object outline (all
frames were presented for 1 s)
continued until an answer was
provided. In case of a correctly
answered trial, the build-up was
aborted and the experiment
proceeded with the next trial
(full grey arrow). In case of an
incorrectly answered trial,
build-up continued until another
answer was provided or until the
build-up was completed
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We used a backward model selection procedure,
applying the hierarchical principle, and starting with a full
model, which included linear, quadratic and cubic main
effects of time, all main effects of the predictors, and all
two-way interactions between predictors. To evaluate the
variability in time of these effects, we also included the
interactions between the linear and quadratic effects of
time and the other effects. The earliest frame numbers, in
which no identifications were made, were excluded from
the analyses (Experiment 1: exclusion frame number 1–10;
Experiment 2: exclusion frame number 1–6), and the
hazard model was fitted on the frame number with a sur-
vival probability of approximately .50 (Experiment 1:
frame number 14, Experiment 2: frame number 11).
Afterwards, the selected model was also fitted on the other
frame numbers.
In the following sections, we will present the final
(reduced) hazard model. The first five parameters in the
tables (in Appendices 4 and 6) always describe the shape of
the baseline cloglog hazard function. This baseline shows
the evolvement of the hazard for the baseline condition,
i.e., the average TD participant (participant group = 0),
with a complex (homogeneity = 0), asymmetrical (sym-
metry = 0) and manmade (natural = 0) object. Parameter
estimates are expressed in cloglog hazard units. After ex-
ponentiating the parameter estimates, they can be inter-
preted as the ratio of the hazard in two groups—the one for
which the predictor value is 1 and the one for which it is 0.
Results
Although the results of Experiment 1 and 2 will be pre-
sented separately (in Experiment 1: 10-to-14-Year Olds
and Experiment 2: 6-to-10-Year Olds sections, resp.), both
sections have a similar outline. First, some general statis-
tics will be presented (in ‘‘Descriptive Statistics and
Overall Results’’ sections): the recognition rate (Do both
participant groups differ in the percentage correctly iden-
tified contours?) and the number of attempts (Do both
participant groups differ in the number of answers they
provide?). In addition to these general summary statistics,
results from the event history analyses will be presented (in
‘‘Event History Analysis: General’’ and ‘‘Event History
Analysis: Effect of Participant Group’’ sections). Instead of
evaluating an effect at a certain moment, event history
analyses provide us with a detailed picture of the evolution
of the recognition rate during the whole time-course of
stimulus build-up. In other words: What is the probability
that you recognize the contour (given that you did not do so
before)? And how does this conditional probability (the so-
called hazard probability) evolve over time? Note that time
is measured in frame numbers in the context of this
experiment. Hence, our question could be reformulated as
follows: How does the hazard probability evolve in func-
tion of the organization of the elements into an organized
contour?
The event history sections begin with specifying our
prediction model, and describing the baseline of the hazard
probability (beginning of sections ‘‘Event History Ana-
lysis: General’’). This baseline hazard function refers to the
conditional probability that the average ‘baseline’ object
(i.e., complex, asymmetrical, manmade object) is recog-
nized by the average ‘baseline’ participant (i.e., the average
TD participant) during a certain time frame, given that it
has not been identified yet. In the next sections, we will
present the effects of the different predictors (such as
participant group, and the stimulus characteristics), the
interactions between the predictors, and the evolution of
these effects throughout the stimulus build-up.
Experiment 1: 10-to-14-Year Olds
Descriptive Statistics and Overall Results
Although the overall correct identification rate tended to be
slightly higher in the TD group (M = 92.95 %, SD = .04)
than in the ASD group (M = 89.11 %, SD = .10), the
difference was not statistically significant (Mann–Whitney
U-test: z = 1.63, p = .1025). There was also no evidence
for fewer or more attempts in providing an answer in the
ASD group: both groups provided an equal number of
attempts per trial (ASD: M = 1.09, SD = .08; TD:
M = 1.07, SD = .06; Mann–Whitney U-test: z = -.51,
p = .6088).
Event History Analysis: General
The final (reduced) hazard model fitted at frame number 14
comprised 20 parameters, displayed in Table 6 (Appendix
3) together with their parameter estimates, standard errors,
Chi square values, and p values. In Appendix 4, the model
based hazard plots of all conditions are displayed.
The hazard in the baseline condition (described by
parameter 1–5, and displayed by the full line in Fig. 4),
was rather low for the earlier frames, and slowly increased
to .20 around frame number 15. In other words, the con-
ditional probability that the average TD participant cor-
rectly identifies a baseline object (i.e., complex,
asymmetrical, manmade) between the 15th and 16th frame
is estimated to be about 20 % (given that the object has not
been identified correctly before the start of frame 15). This
conditional hazard probability increased sharply across the
last frames, and reached approximately 31 % at the final
frame number. This late increase in the hazard of event
occurrence reflects the fact that observers could inspect the
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final 100 % collinear version, thus increasing the chance
that the correct name will be given after all. The graph in
Fig. 4 also shows that the average ASD participant (dotted
line) had a lower conditional hazard probability, i.e., the
average ASD participant had a lower probability to cor-
rectly identify the object at all frame numbers. (This effect
will be substantiated statistically in the next section.)
Event History Analysis: Effect of Participant Group
A main effect of group was found (Supplementary mate-
rial, Appendix 3, Table 6: parameter 6, -.2457 in cloglog
hazard units, p = .0159, e-.2457 = .78), indicating that the
ASD children had an identification disadvantage in com-
parison to TD children: they had a systematically lower
(cloglog) hazard than controls (see also Fig. 3). In other
words, the hazard of event occurrence (i.e., correct iden-
tification) for the ASD group is estimated to be .78 times
smaller than that for the TD group, in each frame number.
There were no significant interactions between partici-
pant group and any of the other predictors in our final
model (see Appendix 3).
Event History Analysis: Effects of Stimulus Characteristics
(Across Both Participant Groups)
There was a main effect of symmetry (parameter 12, .3526
in cloglog hazards, p = .0004), which significantly chan-
ged over time (parameter 13–14), indicating that symmet-
rical objects had an identification advantage in earlier time
frames (compared to non-symmetrical ones). This differ-
ence decreased in later time frames, and switched into an
advantage for non-symmetrical objects (e.g., frame number
16: -.2815 in cloglog hazard units, p = .0231). An iden-
tification advantage for highly homogeneous (simple)
objects (in comparison to complex objects) was found too
(parameter 9: .5556 in cloglog hazard units, p \ .0001).
The main effect of object category was not significant
(parameter 7: .1332 in cloglog hazard units, p = .1307).
We identified several significant interactions between
these stimulus characteristics: between object category and
homogeneity (parameter 15), between object category and
symmetry (parameters 16–17), and between homogeneity
and symmetry (parameter 20). Since these did not interact
with participant group and were in themselves not the focus
of this study, they will not be discussed further. For more
information, we refer to Appendix 3 and 4.
Experiment 2: 6-to-10-Year Olds
Descriptive Statistics and Overall Results
The TD group overall correctly identified outlines in
93.14 % (SD = .04) of the trials, which was significantly
higher than the ASD group (M = 89.28 %, SD = .05;
Mann–Whitney U-test: z = -2.64, p = .0084). There was
no evidence for fewer or more attempts in providing an
answer in the TD group (ASD group: M = 1.15,
SD = .08; TD group: M = 1.14; SD = .13; Mann–Whit-
ney U-test: z = 1.27, p = .2033).
Event History Analysis: General11
The final (reduced) hazard model fitted at frame number
11 comprised 22 parameters, displayed in Appendix 5
(Supplementary material) together with their parameter
estimates, standard errors, Chi square values, and p
values. In Appendix 6 (Supplementary material), the
model based hazard plots of all conditions are
displayed.
The hazard in the baseline condition (described by
parameter 1–5, and displayed by the light-colored full line
in Fig. 5), was low for the earlier frames, and increased to
.14 around frame number 13. In other words, the condi-
tional probability that the average TD participant cor-
rectly identifies a baseline object (i.e., an asymmetrical,
manmade object with low homogeneity) during frame
number 13 equals .14 (given that the object has not been
identified correctly before the start of frame 13). This
conditional hazard probability decreased in the following
frame numbers (hazard equals .11 for frame number 17),
and then increased steeply (as in Experiment 1) and
reached approximately 30 % at the final frame number.
The graph in Fig. 5 (dotted lines) also showed that the
























Fig. 4 A model-based estimated hazard plot, for complex (homoge-
neity = 0), asymmetrical (symmetry = 0) manmade (natural = 0)
objects, comparing the ASD group (dotted line) and the TD group
(full line, i.e., baseline condition) in Experiment 1 (10-to-14-year
olds)
1 Note. In Experiment 2, both male and female participants were
included, whereas in Experiment 1, only boys participated. Fitting the
reduced model at a subset of only male participants, yielded similar
results.
J Autism Dev Disord
123
than the average TD participant, i.e., the average ASD
participant had a lower conditional probability to cor-
rectly identify the object. However, due to the interaction
between participant group (homogeneity) and time, the
effect of participant group was not significant for all
frame numbers. (This effect will be substantiated statis-
tically in the next section.)
Event History Analysis: Effect of Participant Group
Although the ASD group had an identification disadvan-
tage at all frame numbers (notice the negative sign in the
parameter estimates, see Table 2), this disadvantage
increased with time, and the main effect of participant
group was only significant at later frames (e.g., from frame
number 15 onwards). The interaction between participant
group and homogeneity evolved significantly over time
(parameter 18, see also Fig. 5). Graphical exploration of
Fig. 5 and fitting the model at frames other than frame
number 11 (see Table 2), indicated that the ASD group had
an identification disadvantage for low homogeneous, thus
complex objects (and not for simple ones). However, this
interaction between participant group and homogeneity
was only significant (parameter 16) at later frame numbers
(e.g., frame number 19 onwards), and not in earlier ones
(see, e.g., frame number 7–17, see Table 2). Graphical
exploration of Fig. 5 also suggested that the ASD group
had a slight disadvantage for highly homogeneous, simple
objects (compare the dark full and dotted line) at inter-
mediate time frames, but this difference was not significant
in any of the frame numbers.
There were no significant interactions between partici-
pant groups and the other predictors (symmetry, object
category) in our final model (see Appendix 6).
Event History Analysis: Effects of Stimulus Characteristics
(Across Both Participant Groups)
There was a main effect of symmetry (parameter 9, .2713
in cloglog hazard units, p \ .0001), which significantly
decreased linearly with discrete time (parameter 10),
indicating that symmetrical objects had an identification
advantage in earlier frame numbers, whereas this differ-
ence decreased in later frame numbers, and switched into
an advantage for non-symmetrical objects at later time
frames (e.g., frame number 15: parameter -.3891 in cloglog
hazard units, p = .0003). The main effect of object cate-
gory was significant (parameter 14, .1939 in cloglog hazard
units, p = .0049), indicating an identification advantage
for natural objects in comparison to manmade objects. This
advantage of natural objects (in comparison to manmade
ones) increased over time (parameter 15). An identification
advantage was found for highly homogeneous, thus, simple
objects in comparison to complex objects (parameter 11,
.5848 in cloglog hazard units, p \ .0001). This advantage
decreased over time, and disappeared at the latest frames
(e.g., frame number 21: parameter 11, .3550, p = .2202).
We identified several significant interactions between
stimulus characteristics: between symmetry and object
category (parameter 19–20), and between object category
and homogeneity (parameters 21–22). Since these did not
interact with participant group and were not in themselves
the focus of this study, they will not be discussed further.
We refer to the Supplementary material (Appendix 5 and 6)
for more information.
Discussion
We investigated the atypical visual processing style in
children with ASD, using an object identification task with
Gaborized outlines of everyday objects. The outline and
surface of each object gradually appeared in the stimulus
sequence by aligning local Gabor elements from random
orientation towards aligned. We applied our paradigm in
two age groups of children with and without ASD.
Although a direct statistical comparison of the results in
both age groups (10-to-14 years old and 6-to-10 years old)
is complicated by differences in the stimulus build-up, we
found similar results in both age groups. However, the
group difference seemed to be more subtle in the youngest
sample (Experiment 2), in the sense that it emerged only
later in the process (i.e., the identification disadvantage in
the ASD group was only significant from frame number 15
onwards) and it interacted with stimulus complexity in that
age sample.
Overall, children with ASD performed worse than TD





















ASD      TD
High homogeneity (simple)
Low homogeneity (complex) 
Fig. 5 The model-based estimated hazard plotting the evolution of
the interaction effect between participant group and homogeneity
over time, for the baseline objects (non-symmetrical, manmade), in
Experiment 2 (6-to-10-year olds). The estimated hazard probability of
the baseline is the light-colored full line (TD group, low
homogeneity)
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percentage correct identification (significant in Experiment
2 with the youngest age group, same trend but not signif-
icant in Experiment 1 with the oldest age group). More-
over, the event history analyses pointed out that the ASD
group had an overall identification disadvantage, which
remained pretty stable (Experiment 1) or increased
(Experiment 2) over time: the hazard probability, and thus
the chance to correctly identify an object (given that it was
not identified before), was lower for the ASD group at
every moment of the stimulus build-up. Moreover (see
http://www.gestaltrevision.be/en/resources/supplementary-
material for survivor plots), the average ASD participant
correctly identified object contours at a later time frame
than the average TD participant. We are confident that this
effect of participant group is not merely a reflection of a
slower motor response in the ASD group, since the ASD
group also had a lower percentage of correct answers,
independently of their response time (see sections
‘‘Descriptive Statistics and Overall Results’’). The fact that
the children with ASD had a lower correct identification at
the final time frame too (a time frame in which there is no
need to respond quickly), and the fact that this effect was
modulated by one of the stimulus characteristics (com-
plexity, in Experiment 2) strengthens us in our conviction
that this group effect is not just caused by differences in
reaction speed. Moreover, this main effect of participant
group is also not due to any kind of hesitation to provide
a—possibly incorrect—answer in the ASD group, since the
children from the ASD group and the TD group provided
an equal number of attempts per trial (see ‘‘Descriptive
Statistics and Overall Results’’ sections).
Thus, the children with ASD need more information to
identify an object outline (later responses), and, in addition,
they perform worse at this task (lower accuracy). This
reduced ability to identify the fragmented outlines might
contradict their superior ability to detect predictable
structures in stimuli (e.g., in the context of savantism:
Mottron et al. 2013; and in the case of hyperlexia: Cobrinik
1982). Whereas superior pattern detection is often found in
stimuli with a logical, inherent structure (Mottron et al.
2013), the nature of the organization is quite different in
our study. In our task, the earliest relevant top-down
matching predictions originate from one of the activated
candidate object representations (based on the changing
orientation signals). Only when a top-down prediction from
a candidate representation matches the bottom-up input (to
a certain extent), the outline will be correctly identified.
Hence, successful ‘‘structure’’ identification in our para-
digm requires the synergy of top-down and bottom-up
processes, and any superior detection performance of pre-
dictable patterns will not help the children with ASD in our
task. The similarities and differences between different
kinds of ‘‘structures’’ and the enhanced or reduced per-
formance in ‘‘structuring’’ in ASD requires further
research.
Previous psychophysical and neurophysiological
research in neurotypical adults already demonstrated the
importance of stimulus characteristics on grouping and
matching processes in the context of contour identification.
However, not much was known about the importance of
these characteristics in children. We demonstrate that mid-
and high-level stimulus properties such as symmetry,
Table 2 Evolution of the parameter estimates and p values (Pr [ Chi square) for the main effect of participant group and the interaction
between participant group and homogeneity, for different time frames
Parameter Frame 7 Frame 9 Frame 11 Frame 13
Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p
Group -.1886 .2668 -.1299 .2821 -.1097 .2701 -.1278 .1714
TB*group .0005 .9824
TB2*group -.0048 .0952
Group*homogeneity .2264 .1501 .0641 .5038 -.0225 .7935 -.0334 .7259
TB*group*homogeneity -.0244 .3560
TB2*group*homogeneity .0095 .0370
Parameter Frame 15 Frame 17 Frame 19 Frame 21
Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p
Group -.1844 .0430 -.1844 .0430 -.4126 .0005 -.5843 .0009
TB*group
TB2*group
Group*homogeneity .0314 .7741 .0314 .7741 .3879 .0867 .6797 .0522
TB*group*homogeneity
TB2*group*homogeneity
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object category (manmade versus natural objects), and
visual complexity have a significant influence on the time-
course of object identification in children too. Since these
main effects in themselves are not the most prominent
focus of our study—we are rather interested in the simi-
larities and differences between both participant groups—
we will only briefly discuss these findings. First, consistent
with multiple lines of research in adults, we show that
symmetry has an early identification advantage. This
finding is in correspondence with the known advantage of
symmetrical objects during perceptual organization and it
demonstrates that configural properties (such as symmetry)
dominate early grouping processes (for a review, see
Wagemans 1997). The decreasing influence of symmetry
over time, as indicated by its interaction with time, sug-
gests that the early grouping advantage for symmetrical
objects decreases over time. Second, visually simple
(highly homogeneous) object contours, which are known to
have an a priori grouping advantage but a matching dis-
advantage, are more easily identified in comparison to
complex contours (Donderi 2006; Panis and Wagemans
2009). Third, manmade objects have an identification dis-
advantage in comparison to natural objects in our sample
(although this main effect was only significant in Experi-
ment 2), which is in line with previous studies (Gerlach
et al. 2004, 2006). However, these main effects are difficult
to interpret on their own, since they are subtly modulated
by other stimulus properties, as suggested by the interac-
tions between different stimulus characteristics (see
Appendix 3–6, Supplementary material). Note that the
main effects of these variables were highly similar across
both experiments (compare Appendix 3 and 5, Supple-
mentary material). Readers interested in a more detailed
discussion of how interactions between different stimulus
characteristics can reflect the presence of so-called time-
course contingencies (indicative of feedback processing),
can refer to Panis and Wagemans (2009).
More interestingly, we observed an interaction between
participant group and homogeneity in the youngest age
group (Experiment 2), indicating that children with ASD
have a larger identification disadvantage for complex
shapes, and this specific disadvantage increased over time
(see also ‘‘Event History Analysis: Effect of Participant
Group’’ section). Complex shapes are known to have an a
priori early, bottom-up grouping disadvantage. However,
once a complex shape outline is grouped, it activates fewer
object presentations, resulting in a faster top-down
matching. On the contrary, for simple shapes, which have
an a priori grouping advantage and are easier to identify,
the ASD group seemed to profit somewhat less in earlier
time bins, although the group differences were not signif-
icant in these frames. This interaction effect strongly sug-
gests that the demonstrated identification disadvantage in
the ASD groups cannot be attributed to an early bottom-up
grouping problem an sich. In that case, we would expect
that the ASD group mainly had a disadvantage in the
earlier time bins, when bottom-up grouping is mostly at
play, and we also would have expected an interaction
between group and symmetry (a factor which is known to
have a strong bottom-up grouping advantage). Such a
putative early, bottom-up grouping problem has also not
been found in recent studies, as reviewed before (e.g., Del
Viva et al. 2006; Kemner et al. 2007). Instead, this pattern
of results emphasizes the importance of the interplay
between different component processes in the later stages
of the object identification process in children with ASD.
In the oldest age group (Experiment 1), though, we
found an overall group difference throughout the complete
time-course and we did not find evidence for a difference
between children with and without ASD in the influence of
the mid- and high-level stimulus characteristics during the
identification process. Note that the lack of evidence for a
more subtle group difference (fluctuating over time) in
Experiment 1 can also be due to the more limited subset of
relevant time frames in that experiment (virtually no chil-
dren correctly identified the outline before frame 11 in
Experiment 1). By accelerating the build-up in the initial
time frames (when the stimulus changes do not give rise to
major organizational changes yet) and slowing down the
build-up afterwards, Experiment 2 yielded more interesting
and more subtle effects over time. Unfortunately, we can-
not disentangle the age difference and the differences in
stimulus build-up between Experiments 1 and 2, so future
research should evaluate that aspect in more detail.
Moreover, additional experiments could examine the
influence of low-level properties (such as fragment curva-
ture and fragment length) on the time-course of object
identification, and compare this between children with and
without ASD.
Whereas classical visual processing models emphasized
the strict (bottom-up) hierarchy of the visual system,
recently developed theoretical accounts (Bar 2003; Bar
et al. 2006) also underline the importance of recurrent (top-
down) feedback mechanisms and horizontal connections.
The hierarchical predictive coding model (Clark 2013; for
an application in autism research, see Pellicano and Burr
2012; Van de Cruys et al. 2013), and the reverse hierarchy
theory (Hochstein and Ahissar 2002), for instance, both
emphasize the importance of the interplay between bottom-
up (feedforward) and top-down (feedback) mechanisms,
and underline the differential contribution of these mecha-
nisms in visual perception. Recent accounts in ASD also
acknowledge the importance of attenuated top-down pro-
cessing within and outside the visual processing stream (Liu
et al. 2011; Loth et al. 2010; Mitchell et al. 2010), or
enhanced low-level (bottom-up) processing (Samson et al.
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2012). In addition, and in line with the recently developed
visual processing models, the results of our study support
the role of top-down matching processes in object identifi-
cation. The children with ASD might have more difficulties
in considering alternative candidate object representations,
or in top-down matching parts of the candidate represen-
tation to the visual input (e.g., correct spatial positions), or
in flexibly switching between different alternative object
hypotheses, or in iterating through the feedforward-and-
feedback loops, and so forth. We clearly demonstrated a
reduced accuracy, and a slower identification of outlines of
everyday objects in ASD. However, we want to emphasize
that the ASD group still performed pretty well: they cor-
rectly identified almost 90 % of all cases. These results
provide evidence for a suboptimal performance, and sug-
gest that not one single process is completely affected in
ASD. Instead, it seems that the interplay between stimulus-
driven, bottom-up processes and top-down mechanisms is
suboptimally adjusted in ASD.
Our paradigm entails a rich set of interacting processes,
such as perceptual grouping along the contour and in the
figure, segregation from the background, formation of a
shape percept and an object representation, and matching
to object descriptions and names in long-term memory.
Moreover, several stimulus factors, some more local and
others more global, could affect these processes and how
they relate to one another during the execution of the main
task of trying to make sense of the noisy and changing
stimuli as soon as possible. Perhaps the complex and
flexible interplay between component processes is also
what is at stake in perceptual processing in everyday
environments. We believe this could be a more promising
avenue for future research of visual processing in ASD
compared to the attempts to isolate specific subprocesses,
which allow for simpler, more rigid and more controlled
task execution, for which individuals with ASD can do
similar or better (than TD participants). Although simpler
paradigms targeting a single process (believed to be rep-
resentative for ‘‘local’’ or ‘‘global’’ processing) or a single
stimulus factor (relevant for low-, mid- or high-level pro-
cesses) have the advantage of more experimental control,
they also do afford learning of optimal strategies and more
rigid execution of strategies, while they are less represen-
tative for the complexity of processing in everyday life.
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